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This paper studies a simple random matching model of money
in which agents' preferences depend not only on how much to
consume but also on what to consume. It is shown that there is a
continuum of prices each of which is determined by bilateral bar
gaining. A numerical method is used to compute market equilib
rium of the model. As the quantity of money increases the market
volatility decreases as well as the purchasing power of money.
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1  Introduction
The traditional approach to monetary economics uses models that impose
the presence of valued fiat currency into an otherwise non-monetary
Walrasian environments in which all trading is centralized, frictionless and
instantaneous. Since there is no natural role for fiat currency in such mod
els, its presence is forced upon the model. One such approach is to assume
that agents derive utility from holding money. Another such approach
assumes that agents must hold cash before transactions take place. Such
short-cut methods have been criticized for years.
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993) took a new approach. They
examined bilateral trading markets in which agents choose to hold and ex
change a fiat currency for commodities because of its value in mitigating
the double coincidence of wants difficulties that arise with decentralized
trading.
In Kiyotaki and Wright (1991), goods and preferences are differentiated,
so utility from consuming one unit of a commodity may differ across all
matches. The differentiated goods and preferences motivate the presence
of valued fiat money. However, in the first generation models such as
Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), the purchasing power of money (or, the
price level) is fixed because one unit of commodity is exchanged for one
unit of fiat currency. The second generation consists of models such as
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Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995), In which the determination of the
terms of trade is explicitly modeled by incorporating a bargaining problem
into the search model. In doing so, they endogenized the quantity con
sumed, but removed the differentiated goods and preferences in a great
deal from the Kiyotaki-Wright (1991) setup. Recently, the third generation
models such as Green and Zhou (1998) and Camera and Corbae (1999)
endogenized the distribution of money holdings by allowing agents to hold
more than one unit of fiat currency.
This paper introduces endogenous prices into the Kiyotaki-Wright
(1991) environment, without removing the differentiated goods and prefer
ences. To put it differently, this paper, within the second-generation model,
re-introduces the dependence of each agent's utility on the quality of each
match, measured by the distance (defined later) between his most pre
ferred good and the commodity he consumes. As a result, agents' prefer
ences depend not only on how much to consume but also on what to
consume. Since goods are differentiated and agents randomly meet each
other bilaterally, the qualities of matches differ and, consequently, the pur
chasing power of money reflects not only what money will buy in the
future, but also the quality of a current match. Different match qualities
result in bargains in which the terms-of-trade vary. In other words, the pur
chasing power of money is dispersed endogenously.
Since there is a continuum of terms-of-trade each of which is deter
mined by bilateral bargaining game, computing market equilibrium can be
quite demanding. I therefore take a numerical approach to compute market
equilibrium. The main findings are as follows. First, the purchasing power
of money is high if the good is acceptable and the realized match quality is
low. In other words, a buyer can purchase more of a commodity using a
unit of money if he purchases a less preferable commodity. Second, the
purchasing power of money on average decreases with the quantity of
money. Finally, the market volatility decreases with the quantity of money.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the
benchmark economy in which matches are homogeneous. Section 3 stud
ies a model in which matches are heterogeneous. Section 4 analyzes the
market equilibrium of the model using a numerical methods. Section 5
concludes.
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2 A Model with Homogeneous Matching
2.1 Environment
As is standard in search theoretic models of money, it is assumed that the
economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The popu
lation's measure is unity. In this economy money is the only asset.
Following Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), I assume fiat money. That is,
money does not directly generate utility. In addition, I assume that all other
goods in the economy are perishable.
A fraction M e [0,1] of the total population is endowed with one unit of
fiat money. The complementary fraction 1 - M of the population is endow
ed with a production opportunity. No agent may hold more than one unit
of money. With this assumption, agents who have a unit of fiat money are
necessarily buyers and agents who have no currency are necessarily sell
ers.
There is a continuum of differentiated, perishable goods. Each com
modity is identified by a point around a circle with a circumference of
length 2. Each agent is identified by a point on the same circle. It is as
sumed that agents are uniformly distributed around the circle. Agent i is
defined as an agent whose ideal commodity is indexed by i and produc
tion good is indexed by i'. Suppose that he is matched with a seller with a
good indexed byj'. The the match quality between them is defined by
z = Z{iJ'), the length of the arc between commodities i and j'.
Following Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), I assume that a
commodity is acceptable to a buyer if and only if the buyer forms a match
with z<x. In particular, the instantaneous utility from consuming q units of
a good with match quality z is
U{q) for z<x
u(q,z)=\
I Ofor z>x,
where a; e (0,1/2). As is clear, under such a utility function, utility depends
only on how much the agent consumes, given that the commodity is
acceptable to the agent. In this sense, matching is homogeneous, although
there are heterogenous agents. A model with heterogeneous matching will
be studied in the next section.
Production is modeled as follows. The utility cost to agent i of produc
ing q units of the good is c^(q) = c(q) for any i, with c'>0, c">0. Thus the
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cost of producing any good is completely independent oi the type of good.
In this economy, everyone is completely specialized in production, but is
willing to consume a variety of goods.
The matching process is as follows. As is standard in the literature, the
Poisson arrival rate at which a buyer meets a seller is so that dur
ing a small length of time A the probability that a buyer meets a seller is
yS(l-M)A. Upon meeting, a match is formed if and only if the seller has a
good that is acceptable to the buyer. Similarly, the probability that a buyer
meets a seller during A is PMA. It is easy to verify that for each A the total
number of buyers with partners, equals the number of sellers
with partners, PMA(1-M). In order to rule out barter trading in this econ
omy, I assume that no two sellers ever meet each other.
2.2 Search
Time is continuous, but for convenience I consider a sufficiently short
length of time A as a period. Each period consists of two stages. The first is
the bargaining stage and the second is the search stage. At the beginning
of each period, an agent who is matched enters the bargaining stage. If an
agent has no partner at the beginning of a period, then the agent enters
directly into the search stage.
By construction of the utility function, there is an exogenously specified
threshold value of z above which no one agrees to trade at any price. In
particular, upon a meeting, a buyer forms a match if and only \fz<x. Thus,
the reservation strategy in this model is price-independent. Given the
exogenous reservation strategy just described, a buyer is matched with a
seller during A with probability P(l-M)Ax. Similarly, the probability that a
seller is matched with a buyer during A is fiMAx. The probability that more
than one meeting occur during A iso(A), whereo(A)/A-»OasA^O.
Throughout the paper, I consider stationary equilibria, in which vari
ables are time-invariant. Let Vf, denote the value function for buyers and Vg
denote the value function for sellers. The constant rate of time preference is
r. Then the dynamic programming equation for the representative buyer
without a bargaining partner is
Tft = {p(l-M)Ax[U(q) + Vs] + (l-p(l-M)xA) + o(A)}. (2)
14-rA
The right-hand-side of (2) can be interpreted as follows. With probability
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)8(1-M)A, the buyer meets a seller. Given a meeting, with probability x
the seller will have a good that is acceptable to the buyer, in which case the
buyer consumes the good and becomes a seller. With probability 1-
y3(l-M)a;A the buyer is matched with no one and will continue to search
for a trade opportunity. (2) uses the constant reservation strategy. For this
to be rational, it is necessary that
U(q) + Vs>Vb. (3)
The seller's problem is described as follows. With probability PMA the
seller meets a buyer. Given a meeting, with probability x the seller will
have a good distant by not more than x from the buyer's most preferred
good, in which case the seller will exchange the good for one unit of fiat
currency and become a buyer. With probability pMxA, the seller is
matched with no one and continues to search. Then, given x, the dynamic
programming equation for the representative seller without a bargaining
partner is
T. = —^{pMAx [ - c(^) + Tft] + (1 - PMxAWs + o (A)}. (4)
1 + rA
Rationality requires
-c(q) + Vi,>Vs. (5)
It is easy to establish that V;, and Vg are uniformly bounded for all A.
Manipulate (2) and (4) and let A^O to obtain
rVb = fi{l-M)x[U(q) + Vs-Vbl (6)
ry,=pMx [ - c (g) + y, - y ]. (7)
2.3 Bargaining
In the majority of the literature on search and matching, a Nash bargaining
solution is used as an approximation of a strategic bargaining game in
order to endogenize prices (See, for example Binmore, Rubinstein, and
Wolinsky (1986)). I describe in this subsection the model in which the
terms-of-trade is determined by imposing a Nash solution.
Consider the following Nash bargaining problem:
9 = arg max[U(q) + y - y][ - c(g) + y - y]. (8)
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where Uiq) + Vs and -c(q) + Vb are the bargaining payoffs to the buyer and
the seller while Vb and Vs are the values for the buyer and the seller in the
case of disagreement. The first order condition requires that
U'id)^ U(q) + Vs-Vb
c'{q) -c{q) + Vb-Vs'
The quantity of a commodity exchanged for a unit of fiat money in a match
is given by (9).
2.4 Market Equilibrium
This subsection describes market equilibrium of the model. A stationary
market equilibrium consists of Vb, Vs, and q that satisfy (6), (7), (3), (5), and
(9). It is important to check that the equilibrium terms-of-trade does not vio
late (3) or (5).
From (6) and (7) it is easy to compute
_ p(l-M)xUiq) + 0Mxc(q)
^  r + Px
Substitute (10) into (9) to obtain
U'jq) ^  {r + PMx)U(q)-PMxc(q)
c'(q) p{l-M)xU(q)-(r + p(l-M)x)c(q)'
which is a single nonlinear equation.
The existence of a stationary equilibrium has been proved in Trejos and
Wright (1995), so the proof is omitted here. In this paper I instead compute
market equilibrium numerically. Specify the utility and cost functions as
U(q)=Aq'^ and c{q)-q. Parameters used are A=10, <t=0.67, a;===0.4, P-0.1,
r=0.01. It is easy to see that there is a unique q for each quantity of money.
Thus, the price, 1/q, is not dispersed in a model with homogenous match
ing. Figure 1 plots the purchasing power of money (q) versus the measure
of money holders (M). As shown analytically in Trejos and Wright (1995),
the purchasing power of money decreases with the quantity of money.
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Figure 1: The benchmark model
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3 A Model with Heterogeneous Matching
3.1 Environment
In the preceding section, match qualities are homogenous in the sense that
utility of consuming a commodity is the same across all matches as long
as goods are acceptable. In this section I extend the basic model to account
for heterogenous matching. Heterogeneity is introduced by extending pref
erences of the agents. In particular, I now assume that agents's preferences
depend not only on how much to consume, but also on what to consume.
Then, any two goods can be both acceptable to a buyer, while the buyer
may prefer one to the other.
The instantaneous utility from consuming q units of a good with match
quality z is now
ru \ f U{q,z)ior z<xU{q,z) = \ '
L0for2;>a:,
(12)
where a;e(0,1/2). It is assumed that dU/dq>0, dU/dz<0 and dW/dq^<Q.
It is also assumed that Yimq-^dU/dq = <» and Yim.q^ocdU/dq = 0. The depen-
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dence of utility on both q and « is a significant generalization of the first
generations of search models of money such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1991),
which assume U(z), and the second generation of models such as Trejos
and Wright (1995), which assume U{q).
3.2 Search
With probability p(l-M)A, the buyer meets a seller. Given a meeting, with
probability x the seller will have a good distant by not more than x from
the buyer's most preferred good, in which case the buyer consumes the
good and becomes a seller. With probability 1- l3(l-M)xA the buyer is
matched with no one and will continue to search for a trade opportunity.
The dynamic programming equation for the representative buyer without a
bargaining partner is therefore
|y8(l -M)a/[U{q(z),z) + Vs]dz + {1- fi{l-M)xA)Vb + o(A)|.
(13)
As before, (13) uses the constant reservation strategy. For this to be ration
al, it is necessary that
U(q(z),z) + Vs>Vb (14)
holds for any z.
The seller's problem is described as follows. With probability fiMA the
seller meets a buyer. Given a meeting, with probability x the seller will
have a good distant by not more than x from the buyer's most preferred
good, in which case the seller will exchange the good for one unit of fiat
currency and become a buyer. With probability l-fiMxA, the seller is
matched with no one and continues to search. Then, given x, the dynamic
programming equation for the representative seller without a bargaining
partner is
Vs = jySMA/l - c{q{z)) + Vb]dz + (1- pMxA) + o (A)|. (15)
Rationality requires
-c(q(z)) + Vb>V,. (16)
It is easy to establish that Vb and Vs are uniformly bounded. Manipulate
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(13) and (15) and let A^O to obtain
rVb =p(l-M)f [U(q{z),z) + Vs - Vb]dz, (17)
^  0
rVs = /3Mj[-c(q(z)) + Ft - Vs]dz. (18)
0
3.3 Bargaining
Suppose that a match forms with a realized quality of match, denoted by z.
I assume that the terms-of-trade for a pair with match quality z is given by
the following Nash bargaining solution:
q{z) = arg max [U{q(z),z) + Vs-Vb][-c{q(z))+Vb-Vs]. (19)
The first order condition requires that
U'(q(z),z) ^  U(q{z),z) + Vs-Vb <20)
c'iqiz)) -c{q(z)) + Vb-Vs-
(20) determines the terms-of-trade for a pair with match quality z. In sharp
contrast to the bargaining outcome presented in the preceding section, the
bargaining solution may differ across all matched made. This is the source
of price dispersion in this economy.
4 Computing Market Equilibrium
This section describes market equilibrium of the model. A stationary mar
ket equilibrium consists of Vb, Vg, and a continuum of q(z) that satisfy (17),
(18), and (20). It is important to check that the equilibrium terms-of-trade
does not violate (14) or (16).
As noted earlier in the text, studying market equilibrium is quite de
manding because there is a continuum of q each of which is endogenously
determined by the bargaining procedure just described. In what follows, I
numerically study the basic properties of equilibrium of the economy. In
order to make my life easy, I discretize the type space to obtain an approxi
mation of the solution.
Consider an example in which the utility function is
64
U (q,z) = 6(\-z) + A\nq,
• m 1z=i—, t = 0,l,•••,%-1,
n
where 6>l and A> 1. n is Integer. I assume that c(q) = q. Let qi denote the
terms-of-trade when the match quality is z = ix/n. Then, for a sufficiently
large n, (17) and (18) can be replaced with
rVt = p{l-M)x^-[Uiqi,ix/n) + T, - %], (21)
i=on
rVs^pMx^-[-qi+Vb-Vs]. (22)
From (20), the bargaining outcome for a pair with match quality z = ix/n is
given by
Ug(qi,i/n) ^  U(qi,ix/n) + Vs-Vb
c'{q^) -c(q^) + V,-Vs
for i = 0,l, 1. Then there are n + 2 nonlinear equations and n + 2
unknowns. Note that the bargaining outcome given by (23) includes out-of-
equilibrium levels of q.
Following Judd (1998), I compute market equilibrium numerically by
the linear Gauss-Jacobi procedure. From (21) and (22), it is straightfon/vard
to compute
r+pMx • / . p{l-M)xpMxV^ \
{r+Px)r ^qU (r-\-px)r i=Qn
= G''(qo,---,qn-i),
=  , ' , pMxJ^-qi + ^  ,2a s ^~U(qi,ix/n)\r+px)r (r+px)r
= G^(qo,---, qn-i)-
The iterative schemes for Vb and 14 are simply
Vb'^' = G''{qUi,--;Qn-i), (24)
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(25)
where subscript k denotes the number of iteration.
Subtract the left-hand-side of (23) from the right-hand-side to define the
implicit function F'^{Vb,Vs,q(„q\,---,qn-i) for each i. The iterative scheme for
each terms-of-trade involves the updating rule
k  t [Vb ,Vs ,90,9l,---,gn-l) 1
qi -qi jpilrrkH Trk+l k ^ k \ ^" O, i, *"^ h
JrgAVb ,Vs ,qo,qh--->Qn-v
where Fgl is the partial derivative of F^ with respect to qi. It is easily
checked that
ci_ Ug{qi,ix/n)[-c(qi) + Vb-Vs] + [U(qi,ix/n) + Vs-Vb]
t7t2 Ugg{qi,ix/n).[-c{qi)+Vb-Vs]
Let 0=10, A = l, a:=0.5, y8=0.1, r=0.01, and n=50. Figure 2 depicts the
distribution of the purchasing power of money when ikf=0.4. The quantity
of a good exchanged for a unit of money (q) increases with the match qual
ity (z). What does it say? Consider a buyer. The buyer exchanges a unit of
money for a larger quantity of a commodity if the buyer consumes a good
that is relatively less preferable to him. In other words. The price of a good
(1/q) decreases as the buyer consumes a less preferable commodity.
Figure 3 shows how the distribution of the purchasing power of money
changes as the quantity of money changes. As is clear from the figure, the
purchasing power of money on average decreases with the quantity of
money. Further, the figure indicates that the market volatility decreases
with the quantity of money.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a simple monetary random matching model in which
agents care what to consume as well as how much to consume. In Kiyotaki
and Wright (1991) agents are assumed to care what to consume, but not
how much to consume. Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995) assume
that agents care how much to consume, but not what to consume. The
model presented here has the both, and implies price dispersion. Since
prices are endogenously dispersed, equilibrium of the model is computed
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Figure 2: Distribution of the purchasing power of money
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numerically. The linear Gauss-Jacobi method (see Judd (1998)) is used,
and it is shown that the purchasing power and the market volatility de
crease with the quantity of money.
In this paper, a Nash bargaining solution is used as the price mecha
nism. Though it is easy to use, it is in principle a cooperative bargaining
solution. In Kudoh (2002) a strategic bargaining game is introduced and
compared to the Nash solution. A possible future work is to investigate
wage dispersion using a labor market search framework. Such a study,
hopefully, will add some new insights into the relationship between wages,
unemployment, and unemployment policies such as unemployment insur
ance provisions.
(Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics)
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